

The Solipsism of Ladislav Klíma*

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In the Preface to the second edition of his debut work *The World as Consciousness and Nothing* (*Svět jako vědomí a nic*; 1904), written in January 1928 and therefore one of his last texts, Ladislav Klíma describes the main content of his “metaphysical production” as the positing of and probing into two fundamental possibilities:

“Either the ‘external world’ is *in itself* consciousness, or it does not *in itself* exist at all.”¹

Thus, in his view, the world is either a dynamical plurality of beings, each of a mentalistic character, but manifesting themselves materially, or it is a mere semblance of “my” consciousness, that is, the only consciousness that exists. In the Preface, Klíma further notes that, in contrast to all his subsequent works, in his debut work he concerns himself almost exclusively with the first of the two alternatives, not devoting any space to the thought of absolute subjectivism, theoretical egoism, or, in his later terminology, *ego-solism*, until in the eleventh paragraph of section eleven of the book.²

Nevertheless, Klíma outlines the theoretical foundation for both alternatives already in the tenth paragraph of *The World as Consciousness and Nothing*, immediately before introducing the idea of absolute subjectivism.³ The point of departure is an emphasis on the phenomenal nature of all available reality pointing to the experiencing consciousness. In this respect, Klíma’s

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1 Klíma, L., *Collected Essays III. The World, etc. (Sebrané spisy III. Svět atd.)*. Ed. E. Abrams. Praha, Torst 2017, p. 15; further cited as Klíma, L., *Collected Essays III*.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 25.

book carries on an important modern intellectual tradition, most famously explicated in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, only achieving its own originality in the author's radical formulation of this thought:

“‘The external world’ is but a part of the inner world, Sirius is a part of ‘my’ consciousness just as the concept of ‘change’ is; nothing exists for ‘me’ apart from ‘my’ consciousness...”⁴

With regard to the overall tone of the book, it might seem plausible to claim that the quotation marks around the words “I” and “my” refer to the plurality of experiencing consciousnesses, each expressing their own experience in the first person. However, the quotation marks here more likely signify the questioning of the legitimacy of the concepts “I”, “my”, and “the subject”, and Klíma's text that follows just goes to confirm this: “There is neither ‘subject’, nor ‘object’ – no childish fictions based on the illusions of ‘I’ and ‘the whole’, exist – there are only *mental states*.”⁵ What Klíma is denying here is not the thought of consciousness as always somehow relating to itself, but rather the conception of the subject as a correlate of an object that is thus being determined by that object. Klíma rejects the idea of the I as always being situated, in one way or another, in a multitude of particular beings, the I which is being determined⁶ by this situation.

In the eleventh paragraph, Klíma commences his thought process with a radical claim, where he refers – partly critically – to one of his most important inspiring figures:

“That *absolute ‘subjectivism’* – ‘theoretical egoism’ – is irrefutable, was acknowledged even by Schopenhauer, who considered it a thorn in his side.”⁷

4 Ibid. – Of the authors representing the above tradition, most often designated by the name “phenomenalism”, Klíma gives praise mainly to George Berkeley. “His” Berkeley, however, is rather a model example of the “dogmatic idealist” of Kant's polemic in *Critique of Pure Reason*, proclaiming space and all objects in it as mere fictions, than the real author of *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. The term “Berkeleyism”, which Klíma sometimes uses to denote the phenomenalist character of his own philosophy, is thus, before all, a provocative reference to Klíma's own extremism in following this tradition. (For Kant's explication of Berkeley's philosophy compare to Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason*. Transl. P. Guyer – A. W. Wood. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1998, p. 326, B 274–275.)

5 Klíma, L., *Collected Essays III*, p. 25.

6 With the intention of breaking free from the limitations of the subject-object correlation, Klíma surprisingly agrees with contemporary adherents of speculative realism, however different their general aims may be. Compare to e.g. Meillassoux, Q., *Après la finitude. Essai sur la nécessité de la contingence*. Paris, Éditions du Seuil 2006, p. 18ff.

7 Klíma, L., *Collected Essays III*, p. 25.

However strange the statement about the irrefutability of subjectivism may be, it can come as no surprise, since it is merely a consistent conclusion of the thesis that the world is ‘my’ own subjective mental state, as developed in the tenth paragraph. If the material exterior is refused, then the plurality of subjects mutually relativising each other can be refused as well. What is consequential here is the author’s sharp critique of Schopenhauer, who, in the context of his theory, could not come up with a single argument against solipsism and remained content with an appeal to common sense.⁸ Therefore, nothing prevents Klíma from reinforcing his own conception of subjectivity with the idea of the world as a complex interaction of dream-like fictions, concluding with the deification of the thus-understood self:

“Absolute subjectivism is the most uplifting, tempting and positive philosophical possibility: making the individual *everything*, a ‘god’ – pleno sensu, leaves the field free for all the possibilities, e.g. the attainment of ultimate ‘bliss’...”⁹

Perhaps the most surprising thought of the paragraph is therefore its last statement: “Absolute subjectivism will remain an *open question* for ‘us’.”¹⁰

Continuing on his explication in *The World as Consciousness and Nothing*, Klíma throws himself “into the embrace of the first possibility, a mild and decent girl”¹¹ – proving that “that which is hidden behind all matter, [is] identical to that which is hidden behind the brain: consciousness.”¹² The answer to the question of why Klíma abandons the tempting position of absolute subjectivism (although he does not reject it completely, either) is quite

8 Compare to Schopenhauer, A., *World as Will and Idea*. Transl. R. B. Haldane – J. Kemp. London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1909, p. 133–136. – Arthur Schopenhauer not only directly inspired Klíma’s phenomenalism (even Klíma’s understanding of Kant and Berkeley is mediated by the presentation of their philosophy in Schopenhauer’s work), but also strongly influenced Klíma’s rejection of the traditional conception of will as being fundamentally servient, governed by reason. His conceptions of “freedom” (*volnost*) and “liberty” (*osvobozenost*) are, however, created mainly in confrontation with the conception of the “will to power” of Friedrich Nietzsche, the most important philosopher to cope with Schopenhauer. (For Klíma’s relationship to Nietzsche, see especially Heftrich, U., *Nietzsche in Bohemia /Nietzsche v Čechách/*. Transl. V. Koubová. Praha, Hynek 1999, p. 54ff.)

9 Klíma, L., *Collected Essays III*, p. 26.

10 Ibid. The very first reviewer of *The World as Consciousness and Nothing* (Svět jako vědomí a nic) Emanuel Chalupný, attributes a solipsistic conclusion to it. Exactly speaking, Chalupný was quite wrong about it, but, nevertheless, he succeeded in portraying the inner dynamic of the work: “The world is only the consciousness of the subject. I am the subject. The world is merely my fiction – I am all, I am god.” Chalupný, E., *The World as Consciousness and Nothing*. Written by L... (Svět jako vědomí a nic. Napsal L...). *Přehled*, 4, 1906, No. 37, 38, p. 658.

11 Klíma, L., *Collected Essays III*, p. 15.

12 Ibid., p. 27.

simple. Klíma is not primarily interested in speculation, making conclusions on the basis of accepted premises, but rather in making decisions in life. He simply cannot accept egosolistic egodeism because of his awareness of his own self-evident, mostly unthematised, but nevertheless strong faith in the existence of the world and the things in it. However, the thought of egosolism and self-deification, *egodeism*, does not abandon Klíma and, several years later, it finally firmly establishes itself in his work. Klíma poetically describes this acceptance of his own solitary divinity in a letter to Antonín Pavel of March 14, 1914:

“1909, Friday, August 13 [...] so it happened, in the forest of ‘Kamýk’, under a sun at half past four which was covered in a thin, white veil of a bleak, sultry gleam, there it shone out of me, after 2 years of endeavour, the boldest, most appalling, most noble of all thoughts that man ever gave birth to: *to be, from now on, in this life, essentially, truly, and fully a Deus, a creator omnium!* Here and now, to *act*, just as He acts in his most pristine state! – and along with that, the knowledge that this goal [...] is wholly self-evident and attainable in terms of my [...] egosolism.”¹³

“Spiritual exercises” figure at the beginning of Klíma’s conversion, the purported goal of which was an attainment of peace of the soul, of imperturbability towards the outside. Their actual outcomes are, however, ecstatic, mystical states in which Klíma experiences his own singularity, sovereignty, divinity. Although the external world does not disappear for him, it loses its pressing quality and begins to seem unreal, dependent on the consciousness of the observer.

Klíma eventually fails in this egodeistic practice of his – the ecstatic states that he learned to induce grow weaker or do not arrive at all, and so the hitherto practising mystic stands before a difficult life choice. Klíma describes this situation in a gripping manner in a letter to his friend Miloš Srb of November 4, 1917, first published under the title “I am the Absolute Will”.¹⁴

13 Klíma, L., *Collected Essays II. Hominibus (Sebrané spisy II. Hominibus)*. Ed. E. Abrams. Praha, Torst 2006, p. 58; further cited as Klíma, L., *Collected Essays II*. Compare to the author’s diary entry from August 13, 1909. Klíma, L., *Collected Essays I. Mea (Sebrané spisy I. Mea)*. Ed. E. Abrams. Praha, Torst 2005, p. 21–22.

14 The title was given by Jiří Němec, who published the letter in 1977 in a samizdat edition Expedition. See Machovec, M., *The Influence of the Literary and Philosophical Work of Ladislav Klíma on Life and Work of the Czech Underground Authors (Ohlasy literárního a filozofického díla Ladislava Klímy v životě a tvorbě českých undergroundových autorů)*. In: Gilk, E. – Hrabal, J. (eds.), *Eternity is Not a Pocket With a Hole So That Something Could Fall Out of It. A Collection of Essays Dedicated to Ladislav Klíma (Věčnost není děravá kapsa, aby se z ní něco ztratilo. Soubor studií věnovaných Ladislavu Klímovi)*. Olomouc, Aluze 2010, p. 9.

“I have had many and beautiful victories; one great victory did not shine through: the transformation of thunderstorms into a lasting sun. With both extreme effort and energy, with the fiercest fury, for three years I attacked, using hundreds of means: thought and action, inaction and waiting, dreaming, fighting, defiance, roughness, mildness, with many, newly created methods and mental and physical tricks, using asceticism, continuous self-discipline, leaps, heroism... [...] In the end, the entire practice turned into a furious raping of the whole psyche; I was running mindlessly, headfirst like a ram against the walls of an eternal city, waving incessantly with beast-like paws against distant cloudy visions. Growing pale, they faded more and more, becoming more and more grotesque, until they lost almost all resemblance to what they used to be [...] Three paths now lay ahead of me: one of carrying on as thus far: at its end stood grotesquely grinning Stupidity; absolute heroism and Indifference to the *act*: at its end stood a black Death; and a provisory return to the human. I decided for the return to the human.”¹⁵

He found the loss of the ability to attain mystical ecstasies extremely troubling. Longing for a return to the divine states, Klíma suffered for a long time, as evidenced by his numerous texts. For example, in a letter to Miloš Srb of August 29, 1916, he admits that “for transcending human nature, one suffers the – completely natural – revenge of all human instincts, which begin a most horrendous disintegration” and in a letter to Antonín Kříž of September 20, 1916, he writes about his inability to come to terms with the provisionally accepted external world:

“I am [...] terribly unfocused. In my inner situation, every little disturbance from the outside cuts too far and deep and vehemently; in my external situation, almost everything that is around me disturbs me – even that which is inside me; now I will never again properly return to myself.”¹⁶

The loss of sovereign singularity, however, opened the door to philosophical work in its own right. Despite all the hardships caused by his new state, Klíma, who experienced a god-like state (in this human, imperfect life), returns and can now use his experience as working material, as a perspective from which he can relate to the human world, developing both his experience and his newly adopted situation in discourse.

¹⁵ Klíma, L., *Collected Essays II*, p. 293.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 177 and 181–182.

From this point onwards, Klíma's philosophical orientation in the world is motivated by the polarity grounded in the contradiction between the consciousness of his own egosolistic divinity, legitimised by prior experience, and the natural, matter-of-fact acknowledgement of the existence of the external world and of other people, and thus also the acceptance of his own humanity. A reference to this polarity can be found in the basic scheme of Klíma's egodeism, in the tension between the poles of *deoessence* (or *deesence*) and *panrealisation*. Briefly, but cogently, Klíma introduces the first pole, being God in this life, in the aforementioned letter of November 4, 1917. He arrives at the idea of being God through a radicalisation of the idea of "liberty" (*osvobození*), or "freedom" (*volnost*):

"...to attain Freedom (*Volnost*) means to become God. It is, however, necessary to discern between two things, when one has attained Freedom: A.) Understanding and penetration of the thesis – penetration of the thesis 'I am Free, Absolute', strongly enough for it to become a fundamental, unshakable conviction 'ideally' governing the whole soul, setting its key tone, her rotation axis, its home port. B.) A real, wholly serious; *practical* control of the idea over the whole psyche, harmonious, equanimous, and complete obedience to its imperatives. I have attained the first; not the second. The first can be attained in a few months, if one sets out on the right path. The second takes centillions of years – yet, in a certain, very restricted sense, and under very favourable circumstances, already in this life."¹⁷

The core of being God in human life – the core of deoessence – lies therefore in explicit acknowledgment of the absence of any ontologically relevant correlate to one's own subjectivity, of anything not derived from it,¹⁸ and this very being is an incessant self-affirmation of the subject, who is conscious of himself in his own truth: that he is the *absolute wanting* of himself, which can be expressed in the motto "I am the Absolute Will" – and which may be and is desirable to be *evoked* by this motto.¹⁹

An explanation of the seeming plurality of beings and its related finiteness and variously-experienced dependence – animal-like nothingness – of the human subject is provided by the "cosmogonic" idea of *panrealisation*, developed and expanded by the ideas of *ludibrionism* (or *ludibrism*), *oneirism*

17 Klíma, L., *Collected Essays II*, p. 283–284.

18 See *ibid.*, p. 296–297.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 284.

and *illusionism*.²⁰ In a letter of November 4, 1917, Klíma, the egosolite, introduces this thought as an appeal to the recipient of his letter. Here, he ascribes divinity paradoxically not to 'himself', but to 'you' or 'You':

“Your current existence is a God’s Dream; a sublimely ludibronist Dream of the all-willing God. The knowledge of egodeism is the Great Awakening. With this in mind, you can do away with the truly horrendous contrast between the absoluteness of Your Ego and that which Your being seems to be ‘in the light of empirical reality’: a mere animal, completely determined, a milieu fully moulded and fabricated, a molecule in the Immeasurable... – The object of God’s willing can only be Everything; in his eternity, God desires to become everything that is thinkable, thus even Your existence today, – an illusion of Yours and a dream-like autosuggestion that he is small and dependent and one of many; precisely the special illusion that Your existence currently represents. If he wanted to become that, he had to become that; what else could this Divine metamorphosis possibly be *other* than *You*? But this very logical argumentation irrefutably disproves the most popular, seemingly most powerful and, in reality, the most trivial objection against egosolism. That on which it relies immediately disproves it: the colossal paradox of the matter: its divine ludibrosity, the condescension of the Highest towards the lowest, disguising Everything as nothingness – a rebellious self-deceit, the most spiritual game of hide-and-seek with oneself, a sublime tumult. All this reflects terribly fundamental mischievous confusion of Everything, that it itself is the proof – the foundation – of egosolism.”²¹

In Klíma’s opinion, in his own *wanting of everything*, God transcends even his own singularity and absoluteness, and becomes everything, thus also becoming “me”, “a rational animal”, “a mortal”... At the same time, however, God in his omnipotence remains God *pleno sensu*, and his fall into determinedness is thus merely God’s game, through which he plays, deceives and lulls himself to sleep. Nevertheless, even in his oneiric being as a “mere animal”, God still retains his inward tendency: his wanting of everything encompasses also wanting Himself as God – a contrary tendency to self-forgetting. An appropriate expression of *this* wanting is

20 The term ludibronism is derived from the Latin word *ludibrium* (a toy, a game, a play), the term oneirism comes from the Greek word *oneiros* (a dream).

21 Klíma, L., *Collected Essays II*, p. 297–298.

“the position of egosolism – an ascent to an illusionist viewing of the world – that views everything in *victorious* contempt *beneath oneself*...”²²

Thus, Klíma’s abandonment of his endeavour to attain deoessence and his return to the human world mean an explicit acceptance of a dual approach to empiric reality. On the one hand, an illusionist viewing of the world as a pure semblance, where “being tricked is a natural law par excellence”,²³ a ludibronistic game involving everything that the world offers, and in unity with that an oneiristic dissolution of the boundaries between perception and dreaming, while, on the other hand, there is the human – for Klíma, all-too-human – faith in the existence of things and other people, although more or less modified with regard to his own egodeity. From now on, deoessence remains in his life as an unattained – or perhaps merely unmastered – pole of Divine self-embrace in the process of panrealisation, as the ideal of God’s victory over his own self-deceit.

Any interaction with other people – be it during personal meetings, in correspondence, or in the occasional addressing of the reader in texts meant for publication – can thus always be interpreted by Klíma as explicit participation in the illusionistic play of the world, or perhaps even as temporary submission to the universal illusion, but at the same time it is also interaction, entry to the interpersonal dimension, even for him. And perhaps it was this, Klíma’s paradoxical duality that captured the attention of his contemporaries and his readers – none of them became a neophyte of egosolism, but they were, nevertheless, attracted by his combination of a lived and planned denial of the world with his engagement in it. It is as if, for them, this only living egodeist was an embodiment of an extreme level of the human capability to transcend all empirical reality – and, in unity with that, was also a living example of its limitations.

In an article dedicated to Klíma’s second book *Tractates and Dictates* (1922), the philosopher Karel Vorovka, who was always sympathetic to Klíma, renounces any entitlement to critique or review of Klíma’s texts and makes the decision to treat the author’s egosolism “as fearfully” as if one were “mixing nitric acid with glycerine.”²⁴ He gives the highest praise not to the content of the work itself, but rather to the “spectrally and inhumanly strong selective tendency” of its author – Klíma’s love for the noble in man.²⁵ According to

22 *Ibid.*, p. 290.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 183.

24 Vorovka, K., Ladislav Klíma: *The Tractates and Dictates* (Ladislav Klíma: *Traktáty a diktáty*), a review. *Ruch filosofický*, 2, 1922, No. 8–10, p. 73–74.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 75.

Tomáš Trnka, an intellectual fellow of Vorovka, Klíma's importance for the future of Czech philosophy lies in his demonstrating that to philosophise means to "truly think, to agonise over mysteries, or to at least realise the existence of mysteries", but "as for the content of his ideas" he does not expect any future influence.²⁶ Julius Fučík, a young Marxist journalist, also agrees with the main points of these two thinkers of the intellectual circle around Ruch filosofický. In his opinion, Klíma is a "hundred-percent metaphysical poet, whose consciousness encompassed the whole world and whose magical words penetrated all the way to the depths of the inexpressible", however, he thinks that "the development towards intellectual independence and greatness, which has only just begun in our lands," is following a path wholly different from that of "the philosopher of the *Tractates and Dictates* and *The World as Consciousness and Nothing*."²⁷

Of all of Klíma's contemporaries, it was F.X. Šalda who took the deepest dive into the nature of the "earthly mission" of the Czech egosolist. He proclaims Klíma to be "the freest philosophical figure that we have today," and emphasises that he turned himself into this figure "for us and for our sake."²⁸ He calls his readers to:

"...forcefully break free for a day from your offices, shops, banks, counters, factories and workshops, schools, hospitals, laboratories, and enter the solitude of your spirit with a book by Klíma. And come back out of it at the end of the day. No doubt you will come out *different than you entered*. True, you will eat, sleep, work, count, read your newspaper, natter with your neighbour as before. But still! You will be *different!*"²⁹

It most likely does not come as a surprise that, in his text, Šalda does not linger very long on the contentual side of Klíma's philosophy, and that he also, understandably enough, warns (referring to Descartes) of the danger of delving too deep into metaphysical inquiries, which can make one's "casual, active life" seem rather dull and can cause one to turn away from it.³⁰ From Šalda's perspective (and also from the perspectives of the above-cited authors), Klíma may be characterised as a man who, in his egocentrism, unwillingly sacrifices himself for the benefit of others (he created himself "for our

26 Trnka, T., The Philosopher Ladislav Klíma (Filosof Ladislav Klíma). *Národní listy*, 68, 1928, No. 111, p. 9 (signed F. Trnka).

27 Fučík, J., Ladislav Klíma Died (Zemřel Ladislav Klíma). *Kmen*, 2, 1928, No. 4–5, p. 80 (signed Karel Vávra).

28 Šalda, F. X., *The Work of F. X. Šalda*, 9. *Timely and Timeless (Dílo F. X. Šaldy 9. Časové i nadčasové)*. Praha, Melantrich 1936, p. 435.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 438.

30 *Ibid.*

sake”!) and who is then consciously sacrificed by these very people – through their boundless admiration and warm yet reserved acceptance.

A modest proof of this aspect of Klíma’s influence can be found in the philosophical work by one of the aforementioned recipients of Klíma’s letters, Miloš Srb. In his only monograph, published twelve years after Klíma’s death,³¹ Srb deals critically with the legacy of his old friend, where he not only refuses his solipsism, but also distances himself from Klíma’s thoroughly idealistic philosophy, since Srb understands the whole of reality as “something simply given, primary, irreducible to anything else...”³² But even in this book, passages can be found where Klíma’s influence is thought of as wholly positive:

“Only that which *empowers* life is good and right and healthy. ‘To always stand tall and undefeated, to feel above everything’ – is the most important hygienic rule. To accept all that is and that happens as given, and to see it beneath oneself, to stamp it with one’s own seal of sovereignty. Whatever the situation may be, however I may try to deal with it, whatever success or hardships I may encounter along the way – it is always necessary to feel *above* this situation, to feel deeply independent, unperturbed, absolute.”³³

In place of Klíma’s acknowledgement of “the self” as the only true reality, always guaranteeing absolute superiority over urgency from the outside, Srb posits the autonomy of the finite, human subject, with his ability to *be himself* even in a situation where he is ontically overwhelmed by acknowledged external reality. However, Srb remains faithful to Klíma in the experience and description of his own freedom – he feels (although only very deep down) independent, *absolute*.

In his texts written after his turnabout in August 1909, Klíma himself is an almost strict egosolist, interpreting all of the paradoxicality arising from a solipsist’s active living in human society in the context of his oneirism and ludibronism. Nevertheless, even in his writings some symptomatic hesitation may be found. For instance, in a letter to Emanuel Chalupný from May 2, 1912, he notes: “and yet, egosolism is not paradoxical enough for it to finally

31 Srb, M., *A Living Reality. A Philosophical Perspective on Life and the World* (*Živá skutečnost. Filosofický pohled na život a svět*). Praha, Orbis 1940. – At the end of his, to a certain extent, critical review, Jan Patočka notes: “A book testifying of a truly philosophical life, shaming the pride of many of the so-called ‘experts.’” Patočka, J., Srb, M. *A Living Reality. A Philosophical Perspective on Life and the World* (rec.). *Česká mysl*, 35, 1941, No. 1–2, p. 92.

32 Srb, M., *A Living Reality. A Philosophical Perspective on Life and the World*, p. 140.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 129.

become true!”³⁴ Yes, it is not egosolism itself which is paradoxical, but rather the real presence of a living egosolism among people, along with his dialogue and synergy with them.

More evidence of Klíma’s uncertainty may be found in the above-cited Preface to *The World as Consciousness and Nothing*: while comparing the explicit pluralism of his debut work with his later philosophy of egosolism (the core thought of which is already present in this, his debut work), Klíma surprises the reader with a proclamation that is syntactically odd in Czech language: “To this day, the reconciliation of both has obviously not been attempted. („O smíření obého se zjevně dosud nepokuseno.”)³⁵ In the notes to the third volume of Klíma’s *Collected Works (Sebrané spisy)*, Erika Abrams includes the original, deleted form of the sentence: “Obviously I have not, to this day, attempted the reconciliation of both.”³⁶ The need to change the original formulation of the thought, to make it impersonal, may be a sign of the author’s indecision – on the one hand, an awareness of a deficiency of egosolism is apparent, even though this awareness does not lead to its complete rejection. On the other hand, he feels a foreboding of his own incompetence to surpass egosolism.

It was beyond Klíma’s powers to utter the whole truth of what it was like for a convinced egosolism to live among other people, among “us” – however, not even his friends or readers are competent enough to formulate it. Each one of them can only point to a certain aspect of it, conditioned by their own perspective, and not even the sum of such perspectives – which is essentially unlimited, because dialogue with Klíma is not just a thing of the past even in today’s age – can bring us to a definitive conclusion regarding his legacy. And perhaps that is where the value of Klíma’s life and work lies.

34 Klíma, L., *Collected Essays II*, p. 33.

35 Klíma, L., *Collected Essays III*, p. 15.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 697.