
Summaries

PAUL RATEAU

Does the Doctrine of the Complete Notion Provide a Real Definition of Individual Substance?

The aim of this paper is to explain how Leibniz elaborates his concept of individual substance at the time of the *Discourse on Metaphysics* by studying each of the theoretical instruments he uses to this end (in particular in article 8). It shows what Leibniz takes from the tradition and how he departs from it, especially in his use of the logical rule of *Praedicatum inest subjecto*. His use is original insofar as it introduces a singular relationship between logic and metaphysics – a relationship that is exactly opposite to that suggested by the logicist interpretation, according to which the second would derive from the first. It appears, however, that the notional completeness – which Leibniz presents as the mark of substantial individuality – is not, in itself, sufficient to determine an individual, and that it could only be applied to concrete beings and does not give a real definition of an individual substance in the strict sense.

MARTIN ŠKÁRA

Logical Possibility and Individual Substance by Leibniz: Metaphysics of Non-contradiction?

The different past and current interpretations of the notion of individual substance introduced by Leibniz in his *Discourse on Metaphysics* shed more and more light on this notion, which will be followed by that of Monad. In spite of this notional framework, relative to the Leibnizian substance, it goes through a remarkable evolution, and a common feature of this evolution remains fixed and unchanged: logical possibility. Few analyses point out the importance of this *conditio sine qua non* of any actual being, of every existence as Leibniz himself says. The present study focuses on the necessity of the principle of contradiction in the analysis of the notion of individual substance during the period of the *Discourse of Metaphysics*. First, we try to show how logical possibility is required by the real definition of the notion of individual substance in the *Discourse of Metaphysics*. We then proceed to an explanation of the coupling: logical possibility – non-contradiction. Finally, our analysis leads to the problematic of existence submitted to the divine will and the metaphysical possible submitted to the divine intellect.

RICHARD T. W. ARTHUR

Vague States, Discontinuous Changes, and the Principle of Continuity in Leibniz

In this paper I tackle the problem of the apparent incompatibility between Leibniz's assertions of the discreteness of the actual and of the universal applicability of his Law of Continuity. The problem has many aspects: How could Leibniz consistently maintain the traditional theological doctrine of Continuous Creation and also that each substance produces its own changes autonomously from within? How does he avoid falling into the same atomism he decries in the Cartesians' version of continuous creation? Is there not a contradiction between his maintaining the discreteness of phenomenal changes and his Law of Continuity, according to which nothing happens by a leap? And how can Leibniz consistently maintain that monadic states are momentaneous without falling foul of the paradoxes of the continuum? Leibniz's thought on these issues is nothing if not subtle, and I try to show how all of this can be made sense of by reference to his novel analysis of change in an early dialogue – his doctrine of *petites perceptions* – and his formal treatment of continuity.

FRANÇOIS DUCHESNEAU

Leibniz's Definition of the Living Being

In Leibniz's philosophy, in the aftermath of the *Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances* (1695), the notion of living being would refer to a substantial type of entity, combining a monad and an organic body. Leibniz invented the concept of "machine of nature" to designate this living being and signify its ontological status. The leading tendency among interpreters of Leibniz's biological thought is to take this notion to be an explication of organic body, with reference to those artificial mechanical models that were made use of to account for organic structures and processes. This epistemological use was indeed to be found in Leibniz, but "machines of nature" should be granted deeper theoretical meaning, since they represent the living beings – that is, the only substances in nature that we are experientially made aware of. This substantial condition remains however ambiguous when referred to the criterion of true unity, which is only met by monads, souls, or minds in the order of finite realities. In order to grant the living a substantial status, it seems required to conceive that they possess a unity grounded on a network of relations which Leibniz accounts for by elaborating the conceptual and definitional framework of his machines of nature. The goal of this article is to reconstitute the genesis and compounding relations of such a framework.

JAN PALKOSKA

The Leibniz-Clarke Debate on the Determination of the Will

The aim of the paper is to offer an account of the controversy concerning the issue of the determination of the will in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. After setting the

issue in the context, that is, as a device to decide on non-circular grounds the pivotal question of the adequate interpretation of the Principle of sufficient reason, I analyse the subsequent stages of the discussion so as to offer a precise statement of the real crux of the debate: namely, the question of whether intra-mental motives are causally in operation in the determination of the will to volitions. Finally, I trace the reasons that probably stand behind the opposing standpoints of both correspondents concerning this last question. In particular, I argue that once the intra-mental motives in question are interpreted – plausibly, given the context of the debate – as judgments concerning propositionally-structured normative content, the nature of Clarke’s repeated charges against Leibniz in terms of fatalism and blind necessity comes out distinctly, as well as the answer to the question of why Leibniz decides to respond to these charges in the ways he does.

ENRICO PASINI

Blandior Orthodoxia, or: Is There Any 18th-Century Orthodox Leibnizianism?

This paper aims at posing the question whether one or more “orthodox” Leibnizianisms can be instantiated in the century that followed the German philosopher’s death. A distinction is proposed between orthodoxy as the strictly correct doctrine, which intends to be “faithful,” and a weaker and blander orthodoxy, blandior orthodoxia, which, so to speak, intends to be “respectful.” The meaning of the term “Leibnizianism” in the 18th century, as well as different categories of possible “disciples,” are analyzed. The question can be distributed onto different axes, such as geographic distribution, generations (e.g., those who had personally known Leibniz), which themes may characterize a “Leibnizian” position, and so on. Some isolated examples of various forms of such blander orthodoxy are finally discussed.

JAN MAKOVSKÝ

Between Nature and Analysis: On the History of the Law of Continuity in the XVIIIth Century

The XVIIIth century is called “the age of continuity.” The law of continuity is one of its leading ideas. The pursuit of the notion of continuity marked the destiny of the previous century, especially in the case of the “new science” rooted in the Galilean geometrization of motion on the one hand and Cartesian laws of impact on the other. The whole enterprise of the new science thus required invention of a deeper principle that might incorporate both of these roots and account for the notion of force: the law of continuity. The goal of the essay is to follow the development of the law of continuity against the background of the tension between Newtonian physics and Leibnizian metaphysics, mainly based on the example of the two most famous controversies of the century: the *vis viva* dispute and the vibrating string controversy. We shall distin-

guish three stages of the history of the law of continuity: the law of continuity as the universal law of nature and geometry; the split between the geometrical and physical branches; and the decline of the law of continuity as it turned into a condition a priori of geometrical science on the one hand and into a law of learned ignorance law within an inaccessible nature on the other.

ADRIAN NITA

Leibniz and Kant on Time: Conditional Idealism

In the first part of the paper, I show that, according to Kant, Leibniz has a false theory of knowledge because it remains on a false theory of time: time would be possible through the connection of determinations of substances; so, time would be a simple relationship between substances that is a determination of the thing in self. Leibniz's theory of time is presented in the second part of the paper, and I show that, according Leibniz, time is relative, ideal, continuous and, most importantly, a condition of possibility. Time is a sort of frame; that is, a structure for anteriority, posteriority, and simultaneity. Time is not only the order of things, but it is the condition of the order; it is not only a succession of events, but it is the ground of the succession. In the third part, I show the connecting points between Leibniz and Kant: time is a condition of possibility for the objects of experience. I present the argument that the aggregate (the phenomenon) is successive. According Leibniz, only the monad is permanent, so every individual object is a subject of succession. Given that time is, for Kant and for Leibniz, a condition of possibility of the objects of experience as successive existences, it is connected to the idea of continuity. The law of continuity leads both the events, through the passage from one state to another, and the objects, that are the subjects of the changes. The changes of individual things will form a series, so Leibniz is led to the idea of a law of series for each object. Given that inner experience is connected to outer experience through our consciousness, Leibniz, like Kant, can sustain the relationship between inner experience and time.

JUAN A. NICOLÁS

Towards a Hermeneutic Perspectivism in Leibniz

There is a long tradition of hermeneutical philosophers who have researched Leibniz's philosophy, and there are also several Leibnizian researchers who have dealt with Heideggerian thinking. This work puts forward the thesis that there is a certain convergence between the hermeneutic conception of philosophy (M. Heidegger) and certain ideas of Leibniz. The result is that there are at least three ideas that, in various formulations, are shared by both philosophers: (1) There is no pure or neutral knowledge, but knowledge is always circumstantial. This is expressed by Heidegger in the notion of "hermeneutical situation" and by Leibniz in the concept of "*notio complete*." (2) Heidegger realizes a "turn towards facticity" around the notion of "hermeneutical situation." Leibniz also made a certain "turn towards facticity" concentrated in

the notion of “corporeity.” This element cannot be found in Heideggerian thought. (3) Understanding is also self-understanding. In Leibniz, the development is a process of deployment and self-knowledge of the monadic subject. For Heidegger, the world’s understanding is also a process of self-knowledge of the *Dasein*. In this way Leibniz outlines “the spirit” of hermeneutical philosophy in the sense that perspectivism is a form of interpretation.

VALÉRIE DEBUICHE

Strawson as Leibniz’s Reader: Some Reflections on the Use of Leibnizian Doctrine in Contemporary Metaphysics

At the beginning of chapter 4 of *Individuals* (1959), Strawson presents a foreword that might be considered surprising. In this chapter, entitled “Monads,” he pretends to refer to the thought of Leibniz not as of the real Leibniz but of a “possible Leibniz.” He intends to critique the arguments of this Leibniz, considered by him as a partisan of the descriptive metaphysics of particulars – just like he is – in order to strengthen both of his own theses: 1) the foundation of the metaphysics of particulars on their demonstrative designation, and 2) the identification of particulars with bodies. Arguing so, he nonetheless ignores the possibility that Leibniz might not have disagreed with him. Strawson’s attitude therefore suggests to us a methodological issue: Can we address ourselves to a philosopher without precisely referring to his doctrine? In other words, can we neglect the (real) history of philosophy so much that this amounts to underestimating the (disciplinary) history of philosophy?

ARNAUD LALANNE

Concerning the Heideggerian Lecture on the Leibnizian Principle of Sufficient Reason

As with the sciences and techniques of which it is the basis, the principle of reason does not think. Such is the major criticism that Heidegger makes against Leibniz in *Satz vom Grund*. Heidegger, who is well versed in the Leibnizian doctrine, discovers the first formulation of the principle of sufficient reason as “principe de la raison à rendre.” But he interprets the act of “giving reason” as a sign of domination in the “atomic age,” the effect of a rationality oriented exclusively to the “calculation” and objectifying representation of all the beings. If it is true that Leibniz often presents God in the manner of a mathematician who combines and “calculates” everything in his mind, it does not mean the death of any thought in his mind. On the contrary, in God, as in man, the use of reason and its principles is inseparable from a “cogitatio” (“cum Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet, fit mundus...”). It is not a question of limiting the infinite understanding of God, but rather of inscribing human reason in progress, perfection, towards a thought that is ever clearer and distinct, adequate and finally intuitive, in conformity with “the nature of things” and eternal truths whose divine mind is the ultimate root.