

Editorial

It is fairly plausible to argue that naturalism as a general philosophical attitude or a way of approaching philosophical questions dominates contemporary academic philosophy. The strong impact of naturalism is manifest both in the field of theoretical philosophy (metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind) and practical philosophy (meta-ethics) as well as in meta-philosophy. Of course, this does not mean that all contemporary philosophers consider themselves naturalists. Intriguing and often passionate discussions about the naturalisation of various segments of the world or about the consequences of naturalism for the status of philosophy stem from the fact that despite the large number of philosophers in the naturalistic camp there are also numerous notable dissenting voices that object both in detail and in general to the naturalistic approach to solving traditional or new philosophical problems.

What makes such a discussion all the more important is the fact that naturalism itself is by no means easy to grasp as a homogeneous phenomenon. There is a whole spectrum of different versions of naturalism, from strictly scientific ones, which are close to or even merge with the former materialism and physicalism, to liberal or humanistic variants of naturalism, which have much in common with more traditional forms of philosophy. The term “naturalism” itself can also mean fundamentally different things depending on the context, as can sometimes be seen, for example, when comparing the ways in which the term is used within theoretical and practical philosophy. Only very roughly and inadequately can we define naturalism in a positive sense as a call for a closer connection between philosophy and the natural sciences, and in a negative sense as a refusal to accept supernatural entities, dualism, foundationalism, and philosophy understood as an a priori activity of knowing the world “from the armchair” of conceptual analysis.

From what has been said so far, it is clear that coping with naturalism, whether by further developing and refining its more or less ambitious programme or by criticising its alleged weaknesses, is a highly topical task. The contributions collected in this special issue of the *Philosophical Journal* aim to take on this task and to elucidate, defend or critically assess contemporary philosophical naturalism from multiple angles. Through the contributions included, the reader can become acquainted with a wide range of topics related to naturalism, ranging from problems of ethics, feminist epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of science to detailed analyses and critiques of naturalism from the perspective of contemporary theistic philosophy or non-naturalistic pragmatism.

In his essay Michal Chabada proposes to interpret moral facts as facts of life, using a cognitivist naturalistic approach inspired by Philippa Foot's work *Natural Goodness*. After outlining the main reasons for the non-cognitivists' rejection of the existence and observability of moral facts, the author reconstructs Foot's account of natural normativity, which includes natural historical judgments that can then be used to identify a good or defective individual as an exemplar of a life form. On this basis it is possible to build a type of evaluation that does not depend on our subjective preferences or emotional states. In conclusion, the article argues that only in areas that directly or indirectly concern life does it make sense to speak of moral goodness or evil, and that life facts are moral facts.

The essay by Mariana Szapuová offers a critical analysis of selected feminist epistemological projects that take their starting point from Quine's proposal for the naturalisation of epistemology. The author seeks to identify points of convergence between feminist and naturalistic approaches to the problem of knowledge and science, emphasising the fruitfulness of epistemological strategies involving the collaboration of philosophy with empirical science. The aim of the essay is to argue in favour of the view that the naturalistic perspective is particularly convenient for those feminist epistemological projects that aim at critical reflections on science.

The key question raised by Róbert Maco in his contribution to the special issue is how philosophy can remain a relevant force in the domain of knowledge dominated by contemporary science. He sees the answer in the adoption of a naturalistic position, the main thrust of which would not be endless quarrelling over internal metaphilosophical issues within the naturalistic movement, but rather a greater emphasis on the concrete participation of philosophy in contemporary scientific research. Maco's conclusion is that the real (not merely verbal) accomplishment of the naturalistic turn in philosophy presupposes a change in the process of educating future philosophers.

Andrea Fábiková scrutinises the main premise of Plantinga's well-known evolutionary argument against naturalism, i.e. the claim that the probability of reliability of the cognitive faculties developed in the process of unguided evolution is low. She argues that all the thought experiments offered by Plantinga to justify this thesis suffer from a common defect – they disregard the condition of evolution or fail to take it into account properly. In the last part of the essay, the author presents arguments in favour of the thesis that, regardless of the difficulties that scientific approaches may have in explaining mental causation, they do not justify Plantinga's conclusion that in a naturalistic world there would be no mental causation whatsoever.

Paul Giladi in his essay proposes a programme for future critical responses to naturalism. After providing a topography of contemporary critical approaches to the Placement Problem, he gives an overview of his own critical responses to naturalism and replies to his critics. In the final thematic part of his paper, he focuses on four areas of future research on critical responses to naturalism: the first is a challenge set by Antonio Nunziante concerning the historical and political aspects of American humanism and naturalism; the second involves centring and combining decolonial and queer theoretic discursive formations to enhance critical theoretic responses to naturalism; the third emphasises the need to bring Hegel and Otto Neurath into direct debate on anti-foundationalism, pragmatism, and the (dis)unity of science; the fourth focuses on developing a critique of sexology's scientific naturalist framework for making sense of sexual arousal.

The first four essays are the result of the work of members of the research team associated with the grant APVV-18-0178 *Naturalism as a universal philosophical programme*. The special issue also includes five book reviews that are directly or indirectly related to the topic of naturalism in contemporary philosophical debates.

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(visiting editors)